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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARTHUR BIGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 940562-CA
vs.
Oral Argument Priority 15
DAVID R. CALVERT,
Defendant-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 172-171) on Monday,
June 20, 1994, appealing from the Order of Dismissal entered May
20, 1994. (R. 170-169.)
4(a).

The appeal was timely.

Utah R. App. P.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1994).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the court have personal jurisdiction over defendant, a
Colorado

resident, based

on his

transaction

of

business

with

plaintiff through personal visits in Utah, numerous telephone calls
and letters to plaintiff in Utah, and the execution of contracts in
Colorado which defendant then mailed to Utah?

The issue was

resolved below solely on documentary evidence, and is therefore
reviewed by this Court for correctness.

Arguello v. Industrial

Woodworking Machine, 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1992):
It
is
declared,
as
a
matter
of
legislative determination, that the public
interest demands the
state provide
its
citizens with an effective means of redress
against nonresident persons, who, through
certain significant minimal contacts with this
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled
to the state's protection. This legislative
action
is
deemed
necessary
because
of
technological progress which has substantially
increased the flow of commerce between the
several
states
resulting
in
increased
interaction between persons of this state and
persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure
maximum protection to citizens of this state,
should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23 (1992):
As used in this act:
(1) The words "any person" mean any
individual, firm, company, association,
or corporation.
(2)
The words "transaction of
business
within
this
state"
mean
activities of a nonresident person, his
agents, or representatives in this state
which affect persons or businesses within
the state of Utah.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1994):
Any person, notwithstanding Section 1610a-1501, whether or not a citizen or resident
of this state, who in person or through an
agent does any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself, and if an individual,
his personal representative, to the jurisdic-

2

tion of the courts of this state as to any
claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business
within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services
or goods in this state;
(3)
the causing of any injury within
this state whether tortious or by breach of
warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(5) contracting
to
insure
any
person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting;
(6)
with respect to actions of
divorce, separate maintenance, or child
support, having resided, in the marital
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the
state; or the commission in this state of
the act giving rise to the claim, so long
as that act is not a mere omission,
failure to act, or occurrence over which
the defendant had no control; or
(7)
the commission of sexual
intercourse within this state which gives
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78,
Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for
the
purpose
of
establishing
responsibility for child support.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a civil action to recover

damages for breach of contract.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

filed his complaint November 22, 1993.

(R. 13-1.)

Plaintiff

Defendant was

served personally in Colorado on December 7, 1993 (R. 14), and on
March 4, 1994, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. (R. 18-17.)

3

The trial court considered the

matter

on the written

memoranda, without

oral

arguments, and

entered a memorandum decision granting the motion of April 26,
1994.

(R. 166-163.)

20, 1994.

The formal order of dismissal was entered May

(R. 170-169).

Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on June 20, 1994.
172-171.)

The Utah Supreme Court poured this case over to the

Court of Appeals on September 21, 1994.
C.

(R.

(R. 178.)

Statement of Facts.

On June 24, 1975, defendant assigned a promissory note for
$101,500 to plaintiff1 in satisfaction of prior obligations.
12 f 6.)

(R.

On September 25, 1975, defendant personally guaranteed

the obligation reflected in the promissory note and agreed to pay
an additional 1% interest above the interest rate of the note, in
exchange for which plaintiff waived any claim under certain prior
security agreements. (R. 5-4, 12 J[ 7.)

Defendant reaffirmed his

guarantee on April 11, 1977 (R. 12 J 8) and on January 4, 1983. (R.
12 f 9.)
The September 25, 1975, guarantee was finalized by plaintiff's
signature in Utah. Defendant had signed the document previously in
Colorado.
Utah.

(R. 5-4.)

The agreement contemplated performance in

(Id., R. 12 5 3.)

The subsequent reaffirmations were each

!

The assignment and subsequent guarantees and other obligations
were in favor of plaintiff and his wife, Katherine Biggs.
Katherine Biggs passed away November 10, 1985. (R. 106.)
4

apparently signed by defendant in Colorado, but mailed by defendant
to plaintiff in Utah.

(R. 3-1.)

Defendant visited plaintiff in Utah on several occasions and
negotiated

arrangements

for

defendant's

performance

obligations under the note and guarantees.
114, 131.)

of

his

(R. 47, 54, 71, 77,

The last visit confirmed in the record occurred in

April 1989, and resulted in an agreement, made in Salt Lake City,
Utah,

concerning

agreements.

"time

(R. 131.)

parameters"

for

performance

under

the

There were also numerous telephone calls

between the parties relating to the debt, and defendant sent at
least 80 letters to plaintiff in Utah regarding the debt.

(R. 139-

25.)
The obligor on the note defaulted.

(R. 12 f 10.)

Defendant

made some payments pursuant to his personal guarantee, but also
defaulted.

(R. 12 5 11.)

Plaintiff brought this action to compel

payment of the balance due under the note and personal guarantee.
(R. 12 5 12.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff asserts specific personal jurisdiction, which exists
if

the

long-arm

statute

authorizes

jurisdiction,

exercise of jurisdiction satisfies due process.

and

if

the

Both requirements

are met.
The long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction for acts arising
out of the transaction of any business within the state.

Defendant

signed and sent to Utah a written guarantee promising to pay the
5

debt to plaintiff in Utah.

Defendant also negotiated parts of the

transaction and subsequent payment modifications while in Utah.
Defendant further directed many letters and telephone calls to
Utah.
Due process is satisfied.

Defendant's numerous contacts, in

person, by letter, and by telephone, show purposeful acts directed
at the forum state. Defendant could reasonably have expected to be
haled

into court

in Utah.

The amount of the claim

is large

compared with the inconvenience to defendant of litigating here,
and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are
consistent with the exercise of jurisdiction here.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECT TO THE UTAH LONG-ARM
STATUTE AND HAD SUFFICIENT MINIMUM CONTACTS
TO JUSTIFY PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
A.

Introduction and Standard of Review.

Because this case was decided on documentary evidence only,
this appeal "presents only legal questions that are reviewed for
correctness." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine, 838 P. 2d
1120,

1121 (Utah 1992).

complaint

are

accepted

The factual allegations in plaintiff's
as

true.

"The

plaintiff's

factual

allegations are accepted as true unless specifically controverted
by the defendant's affidavits or by depositions, but any disputes
in the documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiff's favor."
Anderson

v.

American

Society

of

Plastic

and

Reconstructive

Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 112 S.Ct.
6

276 (1991).

No affidavits or depositions were filed in this case

to rebut the allegations of the complaint.
There are two categories of personal jurisdiction:

general

personal jurisdiction resulting from substantial and continuous
local

activity

in

the

forum

state,

and

specific

personal

jurisdiction, which "gives a court power over a defendant only with
respect to claims arising out of the particular activities of the
defendant in the forum state."
While

defendant's

Arquelle 838 P.2d at 1122.

contacts

with

Utah

are

arguably

both

substantial and continuous (see R. 146), plaintiff seeks only a
holding

of

specific personal

jurisdiction

requires

jurisdiction.

satisfaction

Specific

of both the

statute and federal due process requirements.

state

personal
long-arm

Arcruello, 838 P.2d

at 1122.
B.

The Unrebutted Allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint
Establish that Defendant Transacted Business in Utah.

Utah's long-arm statute reaches any claim arising from "the
transaction of any business within this state[.]"
§ 78-27-24(1)

(Supp. 1994).

jurisdiction are any

Utah Code Ann.

Thus sufficient to confer personal

"activities of a nonresident person, his

agents, or representatives in this state which affect persons or
businesses within the state of Utah."
(1992).

The

legislative

statutes

should

acknowledgement

be

that

7

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23

interpreted

in

"technological

light of

the

progress"

has

permitted interaction between residents of different states not
previously possible.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1992).

Plaintiff's complaint alleges:
subject

of

this

action were

"The agreements which are the

entered

performed in the State of Utah."

into

and

(R. 13 f 3.)

intended

to

be

Because "plain-

tiff ' s factual allegations are accepted as true unless specifically
controverted by the defendant's affidavits," Anderson, 807 P.2d at
827, and because defendant filed no affidavits to controvert the
allegations
allegation

of
as

the

complaint,

fact.

It

this

follows

Court

that

should

defendant

treat
did

this

transact

business in the state of Utah.
C.

The Evidence Confirms that Defendant Transacted Business
in Utah.

If this Court determines to look beyond the allegations of the
complaint, the Court should accept as true the factual statements
in plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and the supporting documents.

(R. 148-25.) Although there

is no affidavit affirming the truth of those statements, defendant
did not object to the lack of an affidavit nor otherwise contest
the truth

of

those

statements.

(R.

160-149.)

Defendant

is

therefore deemed to have waived whatever evidentiary defects may
exist.

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development, 659 P. 2d

1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).
The activities of defendant in this state related to the
instant claim include several visits with plaintiff in Utah.

8

It

may reasonably be inferred that the parties negotiated concerning
the outstanding debt during each of these visits.

That such

negotiations and discussions occurred is confirmed by the letters
written by defendant following some of the visits.

On May 21,

1987, defendant wrote what he characterized a "followup letter" to
advise plaintiff of the status of the debt.

(R. 114.)

Similarly

on May 2, 1989, defendant wrote of "certain time parameters" the
parties had negotiated in Salt Lake City, Utah, concerning the
debt.

(R. 131.)
Defendant also sought plaintiff's signature, in Utah, agreeing

to new payment arrangements and to waive prior claims. (R. 5-4, 4139.)

Defendant further made numerous telephone calls to plaintiff

in Utah to discuss the business transaction between them.

These

activities by defendant satisfy the state long-arm statute and the
exercise of jurisdiction will not offend due process.
That defendant transacted business in Utah is established by
STV International Marketing v. Cannondale, 750 F. Supp. 1070 (D.
Utah 1990).

The defendant in that case, a Delaware corporation

with its principal place of business in Connecticut, entered into
a contract with the plaintiff under which plaintiff was to sell
defendant's products in Europe.

Plaintiff's representatives had

discussed the transaction with defendant's representatives in three
meetings in Utah, two before the contract and one after.
calls

and

correspondence

characterized

also

it as neither

occurred,

substantial

9

although
nor

Telephone
the

continuous.

court
The

parties didn't have a written commission agreement relating to the
sales,

but

while

plaintiff's

representative

was

visiting

in

Connecticut defendant did give plaintiff a letter which set out the
commission

arrangement

for

the

following

year.

The

court

nonetheless held that the Utah long-arm statute was satisfied:
Utah
Code Ann.
§ 78-27-23
defines
"transaction of business within this state" as
"activities of a non-resident person, his
agents, or representatives in this state which
affect persons or businesses within the state
of Utah." This court previously has held that
under this definition a person may transact
business within the state despite an absence
of physical presence in Utah. Brown v. Washoe
Housing Authority, 625 F. Supp. 595, 599 (D.
Utah 1985) ; Nova Mud v. Fletcher, 648 F. Supp.
1123 (D. Utah 1986). In Nova Mud this court
held that where a non-resident defendant
telephoned the plaintiff, a Utah Corporation,
to effectuate a contract with the corporation,
the
telephone
call
met
the
statutory
requirements in that it "affect[ed] persons
and businesses within the State of Utah." Id.
at 1126. See McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 2 L. Ed. 2d
223, 78 S. Ct. 199 (1957). Under the broad
interpretations
aforesaid,
Cannondale
"transacted business" within this state in
connection with it's relationship with the
Verhalens.
750 F. Supp. at 1074-75.

STV found a lack of jurisdiction for due

process reasons because of factors not present in the instant case.
Other

courts have

similar circumstances.
48

(1st Cir. 1983)

also

found personal

jurisdiction

under

E.g., Hahn v. Vermont Law School, 698 F.2d

(Under

"transacting

any business" long-arm

statute, Vermont law school was subject to suit in Massachusetts
relating to actions solely in Vermont, including awarding failing

10

grade,

where

law

school

had

mailed

admissions

materials

to

Massachusetts and had advertised in a Massachusetts publication);
Lazzaro v. Charlevoix Lakes. 310 N.W.2d 295 (Mich, Ct. App. 1981)
("Transaction of any business within the state" clause of Michigan
long-arm statute was satisfied where nonresident defendants signed
in Ohio personal guarantee of Ohio loan, but proceeds of the loan
were used for development of Michigan property).
The

documents

before

this

Court

support

the

reasonable

inference that defendant transacted business in Utah.

Because no

evidence (affidavit, deposition, or live testimony) was submitted
to the trial court, and because the complaint unambiguously alleges
facts showing that defendant conducted business in Utah, to the
extent there

is any doubt

as to whether

defendant

transacted

business, the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
D.

Exercising Personal Jurisdiction
Consistent with Due Process.

Over

Defendant

Is

The Utah Court of Appeals recently summarized the due process
requirements of personal jurisdiction as follows:
Due process requires that before a court
can exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant, the nonresident defendant's contacts with Utah must be "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend
' traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co.
v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct.
154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting
Mil liken v. Mever, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.
Ct. 339, 343, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940)). Thus,
defendant must have purposefully established
minimum contacts within Utah, the forum state,
such that the defendant could reasonably
11

anticipate being haled into court here.
Bradford v. Naqle, 763 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah
1988).
Further,
we
must
balance
the
convenience of the parties and the interests
of the forum state in assuming jurisdiction by
examining "the relationship of the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation, to each other."
Mallory Eng'cr v. Ted R. Brown & Assocs., 618
P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah), cert, denied, 449 U.S.
1029, 101 S. Ct. 602, 66 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1980).
Radcliffe v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608, 612 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The record in this case shows purposeful contact by defendant
with this state.

Defendant visited the state at least four times

with respect to this transaction and sent at least 80 letters to
Utah, in addition to payments and numerous telephone calls.

The

cases cited above in connection with the "transacting any business"
analysis also analyze the due process issues, and support the
conclusion that due process is satisfied in this case.
A Colorado case, Tucker v. Vista Financial Corp., 560 P. 2d 453
(Colo. 1977), illustrates this point with facts very similar in
quality to the instant case.

Judith Tucker signed a promissory

note in Colorado, payable in California.

The opinion does not

disclose that she had any other connection with California, nor
that she had ever visited there with respect to the note.

The

plaintiff obtained a judgment against Tucker in California and sued
to enforce it in Colorado.

The court held the California court had

personal jurisdiction over Tucker and the judgment was therefore
valid.

The court stated:

"Here, Judith Tucker was co-maker of a

note payable in California to a California bank and she authorized
funds to be disbursed in California. These contacts are sufficient
12

for the proper exercise of jurisdiction."

560 P.2d at 455.

See

also Alameda National Bank v. Kanchanapoom, 752 F. Supp. 367, 369
(D. Colo. 1990) ("The

[Colorado jurisdictional] test is satisfied

when a defendant acting outside of the forum state executes a
promissory note that expressly obligates payment to a resident
inside the forum state.").
A balance of the convenience of the parties and the interests
of the forum state also supports exercising jurisdiction.

"[A]ny

litigation undertaken in a foreign jurisdiction results in some
inconvenience to the nonresident defendant," but that inconvenience
"must be viewed in relation to the importance of the conflict
litigated, which, in a commercial setting, is evidenced by the
amount in controversy."
Associates,

618 P.2d

Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown &

1004, 1009

(Utah

1980).

The

amount

controversy here, with interest, is in excess of $165,000.
substantial

size

of

this

claim

inconvenience to defendant.

Id.

mitigates

the

concerns

in
The
of

The documents also show that

defendant made frequent trips to Utah unrelated to this claim,
which also shows that any inconvenience of litigating in Utah is
minimal.
CONCLUSION
Defendant purposefully initiated numerous contacts with Utah
related to plaintiff's claim, promised to pay plaintiff in Utah,
sought plaintiff's

signature

agreements, and visited

Utah

in Utah
on at
13

on the relevant
least

payment

four occasions

with

respect to this transacted.

These acts satisfy the statutory

requirement of "transaction of any business within this state."
Exercising personal jurisdiction over defendant is consistent
with due process.
this

claim

are

Defendants contacts with the state related to
much

more

than

minimal,

and

the

exercise

of

jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
The trial court erred in dismissing the case for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

The order of dismissal should be reversed.

Alternatively, the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on the jurisdictional issues.
DATED this

/^

day of December, 1994.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:^
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court ot
Utah County, Siati 3f uun.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAPMA 3. LWcifrk
^

ARTHUR BIGGS,
Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 930400621

DAVID R. CALVERT,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, no oral
argument having been requested, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the
following:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
1.

The court finds undisputed that the Promissory note which was assigned from the

Defendant to the Plaintiff was signed by the Defendant in Colorado, and mailed (from
Colorado) to the Plaintiff in Utah.
2.

The court also finds undisputed that the letters containing the Defendant's additional

personal guarantees related to the assigned promissory note were all written, signed, and
mailed by the Defendant in Colorado, to the Plaintiff in Utah.
3.

Under Utah law, in order for the court to assert jurisdiction over a citizen of a foreign

state, the claim must arise from an act or acts specifically enumerated within Utah's longarm statute. UCA § 78-27-26.

Deputy

4.

Under the facts of this case, Plaintiff is alleging the Defendant fits within Utah's long-

arm statute by having transacted business within this state, as enumerated under UCA
§ 78-27-24(1).
5.

The words "transaction of business within this state," as defined in UCA § 78-27-23,

mean "activities of a nonresident person... in this state which affect persons or businesses
within the state of Utah." UCA § 78-27-23 (emphasis added).
6.

Utah case law supports Defendant's argument that Defendant's mere sending

documents of personal guarantee, and an assignment of rights and interest in a promissory
note, all of which were signed by the Defendant in Colorado, all of which originated in
Colorado, is insufficient to constitute "activities" of the Defendant "in this state" merely
because these documents were sent from Colorado to a person residing in Utah, and the
Defendant traveled to Utah on approximately four occasions in order to consummate the
assignment of interest.
7.

Utah's protection of its citizens, as expressed by Plaintiff, is still limited by the scope

of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Under UCA § 78-27-22, it states:
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Emphasis added.)
8.

Defendant correctly states Utah case law's defining scope of what a defendant must

do to allow Utah to assert jurisdiction over him/her without violating that person's due
process rights. According to Utah case law, the defendant must purposely avail him/herself
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to the confines of Utah law by acts attributable to his/her own actions within the state of
Utah, so that it is reasonable for the defendant to have anticipated suit here upon dispute over
the in-state acts. Mere formation of a contract with a Utah resident, particularly where
Defendant's signing of the Assignment of the promissory note, as well as his letters of
personal guarantees related to the promissory note all took place in Colorado, is insufficient
to overcome the due process requirements.
9.

Also part of the due process inquiry is the question of "fair play and substantial

justice." From the facts of this case, it would be unfair to assume the Defendant reasonably
anticipated his contact with the Plaintiffs related to assigning his interest in a promissory
note, along with sending letters of personal guarantee on a note that originated in Colorado,
would avail him to being subject to Utah law, even though he traveled here on up to four
occasions in order to consummate the assignment.
10.

Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah law, the court finds that it does not

have personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.

Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court
\\
\\

w
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w
w
for signature.

Dated this^fday of April, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

J. Grant Moody, Esq.
F. Richards Smith III, Esq.
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J. GRANT MOODY, #6282
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER, #4910
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
2696 No. University Ave., Suite 220
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR BIGGS,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. CALVERT,

Case No. 930400621
Judge Burningham

Defendant.
THE COURT, having considered defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, and having considered the memoranda
of

counsel

and

accompanying

exhibits,

finds

that

personal

jurisdiction over the defendant David R. Calvert is lacking for the
reasons set forth in the Court's April 24th memorandum decision
incorporated herein:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THIS CASE BE DISMISSED.
DATED this

?

-cfay of

, 1994
BY THE COURT:

R/ BURWTTJGHAM
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following, this
H

day of May, 1994:
F. Richards Smith III
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603
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